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A B S T R A C T
Through ethnographic comparison with Ecuador, I
localize North American and European ethical
debates about embryos. In Ecuador, some in vitro
fertilization (IVF) practitioners and patients do
whatever they can to preserve the life of embryos
through donation or cryopreservation. For this
group, embryos are embroiled in debates about life,
as they commonly are in North America. However,
other Ecuadorians do not view embryos through
debates about life. Instead, these IVF practitioners
and patients let embryos die rather than freeze
them, to regulate the legitimate bounds of kin
relations. These contrasting models of life ethics and
kin ethics illuminate ideologies of religion, kinship,
and personhood in Ecuador. In addition, this
comparison demonstrates that the location of
embryos in a framework of kinship prevents their
circulation and exchange, whereas the North
American and European debates about the human
life of embryos allow for their continued circulation
in the globalized reproductive marketplace.
[biotechnology, life, ethics, kinship, personhood,
comparison, Latin America, North America]
O
n May 25, 2005, the front page of the New York Times carried a pic-
ture of U.S. President George W. Bush at a press conference, hold-
ing a baby born “as a result of one couple’s donation of frozen em-
bryos to another” (Stolberg 2005:1). The donation was arranged
by a Christian “adoption” agency.1 At the conference, surrounded
by many other children born from frozen embryo adoption, Bush stated
that “the children here today remind us that there is no such thing as a
spare embryo” (Stolberg 2005:1). Bush held the press conference as a pre-
emptive strike against a congressional push to expand federal financing of
embryonic stem cell research, research that Bush, along with many other
conservative Christians, claims destroys the human lives of embryos. De-
spite Bush’s efforts, the bill passed, although without enough votes to pre-
vent a presidential veto. The reporting on this event, which posed “life” as
contested, assembles the elements of one half of this article. In this scenario
the ethical debate about the proper use of embryos boils down to the status
of embryos. Are they human life or not?
In this article, I am concerned both with these debates over the life of
embryos as well as a very different approach to embryos that I observed in
my research on Ecuadorian in vitro fertilization (IVF). This other approach
situates embryos within a framework of kinship, not life. These are ethical
frames, ethical because they involve issues of “why and how to think” about
“what is good in life” (Rabinow 2003:3). By juxtaposing these two ethical
approaches, which I call “life ethics” and “kin ethics,” an unexpected story
emerges about what the discourse of life ethics makes possible. Posing em-
bryos as kin, which many IVF patients and practitioners in Ecuador do, con-
stricts the possibility of embryo circulation, while debating their life makes
their circulation possible. At the same press conference Bush declared that
“every embryo is unique and genetically complete . . . these lives are not
raw material to be exploited, but gifts” (Stolberg 2005:1, emphasis added).
I argue that, on the contrary, it is precisely contemporary discourses of life
that contribute to the transformation of entities like embryos into valuable,
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and anonymous, raw materials, some of the essential build-
ing blocks in the global biotechnology industry.
In the last 20 years the development of new reproduc-
tive technologies and practices, such as IVF, has prompted
an avalanche of philosophical and ethical debates in North
America and Europe, debates that often center on the issue of
life itself. Anthropologists have also turned their attentions
to the effects of these technologies and the social arrange-
ments they entail (Becker 2000; Franklin 1997; Kahn 2000;
Modell 1989; Ragoné 1996; Thompson 2005).2
For the most part, however, these studies have focused
on Europe and the United States, reinscribing the notion
of the “West and the rest.” For example, in the introduc-
tion to their seminal anthology, Conceiving the New World
Order, Faye D. Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp wrote that al-
though “women in Europe, the United States and Australia
can get IVF treatments” to alleviate their infertility, Third
World women “may turn instead to religion, popular reme-
dies, and fostering or adoption” (1995:7). More recently, an-
thropologists and other social scientists of science and tech-
nology have come to recognize that this characterization of
a stark technological divide between North and South, East
and West is not accurate, even for those on the economic
margins (see Anderson and Hecht 2002; Arnold 2000; Choud-
huri 1985; Cueto 1988; Das and Dasgupta 2000; Hayden 2003;
Lock 2002).3 This newer scholarship reflects the growing
awareness of how central science and technology are (esp.
biomedical technologies) to the lives of people throughout
the globe (Bharadwaj 2002; Georges 1996; Handwerker 1995;
Inhorn 2003; Pashigian 2002; Paxson 2004).4
We still know very little, however, about the ethical
stakes involved in assisted conception outside of Europe
and North America. Although some institutions, such as the
Catholic Church, claim they have resolved the question of
the beginnings of life within the human embryo, a long line
of comparative anthropological writings has shown that pre-
occupations with the beginnings and ends of life are more
variable cross-culturally than the mostly Eurocentric field
of bioethics supposes (Franklin and Lock 2003; Kaufman
and Morgan 2005; Morgan 1989). Do reproductive technolo-
gies like IVF universally put life in question, or might they
prompt other sorts of quandaries not solely driven by con-
cerns with the preservation of life? To map the distinctions
between some of the ethical discourses surrounding em-
bryos, for this article I focus on the technique of embryo cry-
opreservation. What I am proposing is that the specificity of
Ecuadorian approaches to freezing embryos demonstrates
that embryos are not universally embroiled in the politics
of life. The cryopreservation of embryos is not “automatic”
in Ecuador, as it appears to be in the United States and Eu-
rope, and prompts the question: Why is it that for those in
certain Euro-American locales the creation of frozen em-
bryos is natural and their death is contentious whereas the
inverse is true for some Ecuadorians, for whom it is their
creation, not their death, that makes frozen embryos so
problematic?
IVF, life, and dignity
This article is based on an ongoing engagement with
Ecuadorian IVF since 2000. In 2002–03 I carried out a year of
ethnographic research in seven of Ecuador’s nine private IVF
clinics, all located in either Quito or Guayaquil.5 Although
the mechanics of IVF are roughly the same country by coun-
try, there are key differences in the practice of IVF between
nations.6 For instance, the optimal number of eggs retrieved
from a woman undergoing an IVF cycle varies with policies
of country and clinic, depending on costs, drug protocols,
the local health care system, and the existence, or not, of
regulatory institutions. IVF, which might be seen by some as
an “immutable mobile,” an entity that can be moved with-
out a change of meaning (Latour 1988), is very mutable, in-
deed. Comparing the problems, debates, and anxieties that
surface (or do not) over new technological practices and
assemblages in different sites “provincializes” (Chakrabarty
2000) scientific and ethical norms, although of course some
of these norms are more dominant globally. It was through
observation in Ecuadorian IVF in which I examined how
preexisting cultural forms impact clinical practice that the
specificity of North American embryo debates emerged.
In regards to IVF in Ecuador, one cultural form in-
volved the Catholic Church and local Ecuadorian Catholi-
cism. Church condemnation of IVF derives primarily from
the fact that the research, development, and practice of IVF
involved, and can still involve, the destruction of human
embryos, which, like abortion, is construed as the destruc-
tion of human life (Ratzinger 1987). In Ecuador, most people
say they are against abortion, in line with their identity as
Catholics. But when one looks at the way patients and doc-
tors characterize their actions around the technology of cry-
opreservation, a more complicated story about the status of
embryos becomes apparent. In Ecuador, some practitioners
and patients would rather discard extra embryos than freeze
them. These anxieties about freezing have less to do with the
status of embryos as human life as most commonly framed
within Euro-American life debates. For these patients, what
mattered most was that embryos stayed within the family’s
purview and were not abandoned while the family moved
on in time without them or abandoned to someone un-
known, who might be of a different race or class. Thus, for
some Ecuadorians, throwing out embryos did not neces-
sarily constitute abortion. Embryos were conceptualized as
“family members” who required protection from temporal
discontinuity and uncontrolled circulation beyond family
boundaries, not as “life” that must be preserved. As I shall
demonstrate, kin ethics are not limited to Ecuador but can
be found in the ethnographic record of IVF throughout the
world, especially in sites in which non-Christian religious
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traditions prevail. What is perhaps most striking about the
existence of kin ethics in Ecuador is that the Catholic Church
has not successfully enrolled all Catholic Ecuadorians into
the contemporary life debate. For those who were hesitant
to freeze embryos, the need to establish kinship boundaries
loomed larger than life. Life, as so many social scientists in-
fluenced by the work of Michel Foucault have demonstrated,
is a “contingent concept” (Kaufman 2005).
In his ruminations on modern forms of power, Foucault
declared that since the classical age power has become
positive, in that it is capable of managing life. Since then,
states act primarily in the name of life, even while waging
war (Foucault 1990, 2003). This valuation of human life is
fully enmeshed with discourses of human dignity, which
Immanuel Kant assigned to rational beings that exist above
value (Rabinow 1999). Nonrational humans, those who
would fit into the current categories of the brain dead,
mentally ill, or the unborn, would have been thought by
Kant to lack dignity and theoretically could have been ex-
changed. This limiting of dignity to the rational was radically
altered with the atrocities of WWII. The body, or bare life,
a term popularized by Gorgio Agamben (1998), became the
receptacle of human dignity, because to deny the dignity
of the “husks of men,” left mindless and shattered by the
camps, would have been “to accept the verdict of the SS and
to repeat their gesture” (Agamben 2000:56).
Now, again, dignity is undergoing transformation, as the
equation of the body with dignity beyond value has become
increasingly problematic. “What had been relatively stabi-
lized in the period following WWII in Western countries,
as the body, society, and ethics and their relations are to-
day, again, being remade and . . . functioned desegregated”
(Rabinow 1999:12). Science and medicine have made new
forms of human life possible while at the same time expand-
ing the potential to harness these new forms for economic
gain, alarming the many champions of human dignity. First,
with organ donation and, then, assisted reproductive tech-
nology and genomics, new body parts have become alien-
able and valued. Thus, in certain parts of the globe battles
rage about whether the brain-dead, fetuses, and embryos,
although perhaps lacking in subjectivity, should be treated
with the “dignity” that all human life is argued to deserve.
This distinction between value and dignity is very much
alive in the Catholic Church’s, and conservative Christian,
pronouncements about contemporary human life. Although
the Catholic Church continues to oppose IVF and its related
technologies, it is very important to note that the Catholic
Church remains one of the few voices of dissent against IVF
itself. Despite their call for embryo adoption to save life, nei-
ther Bush nor the vast majorities of Christian groups are
calling for the end to the enormous, private, and unregu-
lated IVF industry in the United States, despite the fact that
the process inherently destroys embryos. The life debates
they engage in do not challenge the existence of IVF, and it
is the IVF industry that produces these extra embryos for
circulation (Cooperman 2005).
My comparison of different ethical frameworks sur-
rounding embryos demonstrates how debates about the
human life and dignity make the circulation, transfer, and
exchange of embryos possible and valuable, as well as
dignified. If embryos are human life, they can be gifted or
circulated through embryo adoption as Bush advocated. If
embryos are not human life, they can be donated or circu-
lated for applications within the biotech industry, usually
involving stem cell research. Within these universalizing
debates about life, embryos are stripped of all social ties and
are made valuable either way, even though they are often
spoken of in dignified terms, using the language of the gift
(Mauss 1990; Simmel 1990). It is this shared “language of
contention” (Roseberry 1993): Are they human life or not?
Are they valuable or dignified? that structures and limits
the terms of this debate. Discourses about the dignity of life
have effectively made embryos biovaluable, a circumstance
far from what the explicit distinction between value and
dignity would predict.7
Global and local embryos
Toward the end of my field research, a widely reported story
in the international media prompted me to take a closer look
at what embryo means in Ecuador. A survey conducted by
the American Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology
found that there are over 400,000 frozen embryos being held
in cryopreservation storage tanks in the United States (Wade
2003). In the news stories this number was made to con-
trast with the holdings of most countries in Europe, whose
IVF industries are regulated by state ministries. For example,
Britain’s clinics were estimated to have 52,000, and Spain’s
clinics 40,000. The difference in the quantity of frozen em-
bryos in different nations was characterized in these press
reports as the by-product of a more strictly regulated IVF in-
dustry in Western Europe than in the United States, although
there was no mention of overall population differences be-
tween the United States and countries in Western Europe
that could partially account for differences in the quantity of
frozen embryos.8 The stories implied that the consequences
of the lack of regulation are an (over)abundance of cryo-
preserved embryos. However, from where I was positioned
in Ecuadorian IVF clinics, this narrative of regulative lack
looked tenuous at best. In Ecuador, where the IVF industry
is even less regulated than in the United States, many prac-
titioners avoided cryopreservation, resulting in a very low
number of cryopreserved embryos in Ecuador. The regula-
tive powers of church and state did not exert control or influ-
ence over the types of biopolitical life-and-death scenarios
that we might imagine occur regularly in IVF clinics, but lack
of regulative control cannot account for the low rate of em-
bryo cryopreservation in Ecuador. Instead, when it comes
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to embryo freezing in Ecuador, differing ideologies of reli-
gion, kinship, and personhood have the power to shape and
restrict practice even without formal regulation.9
But what is an embryo? For this article I have taken my
cue from the IVF practitioners in Ecuador who call postfertil-
ization, two-to-eight-celled masses “embryos.” However, it is
important to note some of the general historical and political
ramifications of using this term. Currently in North America
and Western Europe, embryos invoke “life” in the popular
and scientific imagination (Franklin and Roberts 2001). In
the United States, embryos are almost always connected to
the abortion debates of the last 30 years, but this has not
always been the case. Throughout the formation of embry-
ology as a profession, the border zone between embryo and
fetus remained indistinct and in the early 20th century em-
bryos were made to speak to debates concerning evolution-
ary approaches to race and the human–nonhuman divide,
not to the question of life’s beginnings as they are today
(Morgan 2003).
Within IVF clinics, the slippages between the earlier
border between a fertilized egg and an embryo is more at
issue than the transition from embryo to fetus. I became
intrigued with this slippage at a Pan–Latin America con-
ference for reproductive medicine. A Chilean infertility
specialist explained to me that in Chile clinicians call
fertilized eggs “pre-embryos” to be allowed to practice IVF
in the context of the Catholic Church’s strong influence on
state policy. Chilean practitioners, it seems, have taken full
advantage of the unfixed status of the embryo in language.
The term embryo has generally meant the period between
conception and 8 weeks of gestation; however, the term
pre-embryo is used by the American College of Obstetrics
and Gynecology (ACOG) in defining the early fertilized
mass of cells. ACOG calls the 1-celled entity formed at
fertilization a “zygote.” From day 2 to day 15, the mass is
called a “pre-embryo,” divided into the stages of blastomere,
morula, and blastocyst. After implantation, at day 15 or 16,
when differentiation has passed the point of twinning, the
cell mass is then called an “embryo” (ACOG 2004).10 ACOG’s
definitions of these multicelled masses do not prevent most
of those involved in the IVF industry in the United States
and Europe, as well as Ecuador, from using the term embryo
for any cell mass after fertilization. In IVF clinics in Ecuador,
practitioners would occasionally call these cell masses
“blastomeres,” but most commonly they would call these
masses “embryos.” Thus, cryopreservation, which takes
place when the mass has reached 4 to 8 cells, is generally
understood and presented as “the freezing of embryos.”
Besides abortion politics, there are other motives in call-
ing these entities “embryos.” The IVF industry is predicated
on the need for people to seek children through these ex-
pensive procedures that have relatively low rates of success.
The embryo, unlike blastomere or morula, at least in North
America and Europe, has become synonymous with early
human life, partly because of the emergence of IVF itself,
allowing IVF practitioners and patients to envision these
externally manipulated cells as “babies.” Doubling back to
abortion politics, the representation of these cells as babies
makes it possible for right-to-life groups in the United States
to call IVF clinics “orphanages,” in which Bush recommends
that couples be matched with orphaned embryos.
There are a few things to keep in mind to contextual-
ize the status of embryos in Ecuador. In Sara Franklin and
Celia Roberts’s article “The Social Life of the Embryo,” they
describe the embryo in contemporary Britain as a “work ob-
ject . . . that exists in the midst of complex legal, technical
and temporal requirements” (Franklin and Roberts 2001:7).
Their description of the British embryo offers a productive
contrast to Ecuador, in which embryos are just beginning
to be put to “work.” In Ecuador, as I will demonstrate, the
temporality of embryos is certainly at issue in distinguish-
ing between life and kin ethics, but the legal and technical
context of embryos remains very much in formation. At this
point in Ecuador embryos are not truly legal entities. Two
sentences near the beginning of the newly passed Ecuado-
rian Adolescent and Child Civil Code state: “Boys and girls
and adolescents have the right to life from their conception.
. . . Experiments, and medical and genetic manipulations
are prohibited from the fertilization of the egg until birth”
(Congreso Nacional del Ecuador 2003:3).
Some of the common tertiary techniques of an IVF cycle,
most particularly the process of embryo cryopreservation,
could be interpreted as medical manipulation after fertiliza-
tion. Up until this point, at least, no Ecuadorian lawmaker
or state institution has ever intervened or tried to regulate
IVF clinics, so that currently Ecuadorian IVF practitioners
determine the strictures of their practice without any state
surveillance or oversight.
Although embryos are technical entities for IVF prac-
titioners, in general, embryo literacy among even middle-
class Ecuadorian patients was not high.11 Sometimes when
referring to “embryos,” patients would call these same enti-
ties “eggs,” instead of “embryos.” I was with many Ecuado-
rian couples when they saw their embryos for the first time.
This most often occurred while a woman was lying prone
on an operating table, legs in stirrups, waiting to receive the
embryos. Her husband would be at her side, both of them
craning their necks to see the video monitor through a small
window that opened into the laboratory.12 Because of pa-
tient unfamiliarity with the visual language of the embryo,
the nurses would teach them how to see an embryo, often
prompting them with the instructions: “Look. It’s like a rose
in black and white.” Practitioners would tell patients that
the embryos they had seen were their potential babies, or
sometimes they personified them further by calling them
guaguas, a popular Quichua endearment for children.13 But,
as I learned, even though embryos were imagined as chil-
dren, this naming did not necessarily invest these entities
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with the capacity to provoke ethical concern about their
death.
Extra embryos
In addition to the word embryo, an understanding of cryop-
reservation must also entail a discussion of the term extra
embryos, or what Bush called “spare embryos.” If there are
embryos left over after transfer, they are “extra.” As we shall
see, in Ecuador the existence of extra embryos can cause
concern or relief. Technically, IVF practitioners can retrieve
anywhere from 1 to 40 eggs in a single cycle. In Ecuado-
rian clinics, practitioners usually aspirated between 3 and
10 eggs, the lower side of possible. This number varied for a
variety of reasons. The amount of money the patient had to
spend could determine the amount of hormones they were
given, thus affecting the number of follicles that produced
eggs. Usually 60 to 90 percent of the aspirated eggs fertilized
and became embryos. The issue of how many embryos to
transfer back to the patient and what to do with those that
are not transferred are both subject to norms determined
by local policies of country and clinic. In Ecuador, practi-
tioners usually transferred 2–4 embryos into their patients,
although there could be up to 16 embryos created in a sin-
gle IVF cycle. The transfer of a limited number of embryos
into a woman’s body produces extra embryos, those left out
of body, wholly new objects brought into existence through
the technology of IVF, or what Sarah Franklin calls “new bi-
ologicals” (Franklin 2001:30). In about 60 percent of the IVF
cycles I witnessed in Ecuador, there was at least one embryo
left over after transfer; thus, 60 percent of the time there were
extra embryos. These embryos could either be immediately
transferred to another patient’s uterus (if it was hormonally
prepared in advance), frozen for storage, disposed of, or used
for study, although the latter is not common in Ecuador, in
which little investigative research is conducted.
Freezing takes about three to four hours. The biolo-
gist first gradually brings the embryos to a low temperature
with liquid nitrogen. When the embryos are cold enough,
the biologist puts the embryos in pipettes that are then
stored in liquid nitrogen tanks.14 The three Ecuadorian clin-
ics that had cryopreservation facilities charged patients $800
to freeze embryos and about the same to defrost them. They
also charged about $200 a year to maintain their embryos,
but in the cases in which patients had stopped paying this
fee, the practitioners did not defrost embryos to dispose
of them. The freezing and thawing processes can damage
embryos, especially poor-quality ones. Potentially, the em-
bryos will not survive the thawing process, although this was
not of primary concern for most Ecuadorian practitioners
and patients.15 In Ecuador, neither practitioners nor patients
considered poor-quality embryos to be worthy of mention,
or cryopreservation. These feo (ugly) embryos were not con-
sidered “extra,” which diverges from the Catholic Church’s
pronouncements on the matter, in which all embryos are
human life regardless of attractiveness.16
Recently, church spokespeople have taken a stance
against the cryopreservation of embryos, in addition to IVF.
“The horror of spare embryos” has been deemed an af-
front to human dignity, “an abusive situation against those
lives, which can be compared to therapeutic cruelty” (Zenit
2003a). However, neither Pope Benedict nor Pope John Paul
II before him made magisterial statements about cryopreser-
vation, and within the church there are debates about these
“unethically” produced humans. In Spain, the local episco-
pal conference has recommended the unfreezing of embryos
to let them “die in peace” (Zenit 2003a) whereas other church
theologians advocate adoption (Zenit 2003b, 2005).
Region, religion, relatedness
In Ecuador’s infertility clinics, it was evident that church
mandates to preserve human embryonic life informed eth-
ical action on the part of many patients and practitioners.
However, the understanding of the embryo was not unitary
throughout the nation’s clinics, and IVF participants’ reac-
tions to cryopreservation were formed within complex his-
toric, regional differences between the sierra and the coast.
At the time of my research, there were seven IVF clinics in
Quito (in the Andean Sierra) and two clinics in Guayaquil,
a commercial port and the nation’s largest city. The richly
imagined and elaborated historic divisions between these
two cities manifested in the practices and ethics of practi-
tioners and patients with regard to embryos. Quito is the
older city of the two, founded on an important Incan ad-
ministrative and trading center in the sierra highlands, and
marked, since the colonial period, by its relative inaccessibil-
ity to the coast and other trade thoroughfares. Today, Quito
remains Ecuador’s administrative center and capital of the
country. The humid, lowland port city of Guayaquil, located
on the Guayas River, near the southern coast, was founded to
serve Ecuador in the Pacific trade and is the more commer-
cial and prosperous of the two cities. The ideological differ-
ences between the two cities coalesced in the 19th century
with economic and political clashes between the coastal,
progressive, commercial class, proponents of open markets
and extended suffrage, and the conservative, royalist, tradi-
tionally Catholic landholders in the sierra (Clark 2002; Kasza
1980; Larson 2004).17
I spent the majority of my early fieldwork in the Quiteño
clinics and became accustomed to the fact that the practi-
tioners I observed were generally hesitant to freeze embryos
even when they had the technical means to do so. Patients
I interviewed in Quiteño clinics (who came from all over
the country) were about evenly split in their attitudes to-
ward embryo cryopreservation. When I began observations
and interviews in Guayaquil, I was surprised, then, at how
uniformly enthusiastic all patients and practitioners were
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toward embryo cryopreservation, even though the technol-
ogy had only recently become available in Guayaquil.
One of the factors underlying the different approaches
to embryos in Ecuador involved the regional 19th-century
battleground between forms of religiosity. Unlike the early
modern conflict between Catholics and Protestants in West-
ern Europe, in much of Latin America, including Ecuador,
18th- and 19th-century religious divides took place within
the flock of church faithful instead of from outside and
against it. Historian Pamela Voekel portrays the emerging
Latin American merchant class as men who saw themselves
as “self”-fashioned into a new form of Catholic subject, heav-
ily borrowed from the Protestant reformation (2002). These
men, whom she calls “enlightened Catholics,” proclaimed
themselves sober, civic-minded, self-disciplined, and ratio-
nally bureaucratic. They objected to what they saw as lax
attention to church doctrine, along with extravagant dis-
plays of personalistic devotion to saints, which mirrored en-
trenched patron–client hierarchies.18 In Ecuador, this divi-
sion between forms of Catholic subjectivity split regionally
between coast and sierra.
In Quito, most practitioners and about half of the pa-
tients were less likely to adhere to church doctrine and more
likely to pray to saints and the Virgin Mary to personally in-
tercede for them in terms of IVF success.19 In Quito, sev-
eral practitioners had images of the Virgin Mary in their
laboratories, which were integral parts of their IVF prac-
tice. They were also more likely to imagine God as less
concerned with the abstract life of embryos than with the
propagation of children. Guayaquileño practitioners and pa-
tients, however, tended toward a somewhat more doctrinaire
Catholicism, demonstrated by their concern with the life of
embryos. These practitioners and patients would criticize
Catholics who prayed to saints or the Virgin Mary for inter-
cession on their behalf. Their disdain for communicating
to God through a patron saint parallels the disdain 19th-
and early-20th-century coastal merchants had for the hier-
archical patron–client relations of the sierra that they saw
as inhibiting free trade and the free circulation of laborers
throughout Ecuador (Clark 2002).
The different religious subjectivities I found in Quiteño
and Guayaquileño IVF clinics also paralleled discourses of
relatedness as demonstrated by attitudes toward adoption
and egg donation. Highland sierran mestizos, both rural and
urban, have been characterized as closed, mistrustful, pos-
sessing strict boundaries around family, and having weak
ties to other families in their neighborhoods (Verdesoto et al.
1995). The fact of keeping most personal relations within the
“family” has been a long-standing staple of anthropological
writings on the Andes and is often analyzed as one facet in
the maintenance of a rigidly stratified society (Smith 1984).
Some anthropologists of the Andes attribute this suspicious-
ness of others to the greater penetration of the exploitative
hacienda system in the highlands so that in highland, mes-
tizo, peasant communities, and elsewhere, the consanguinal
family was “the only social group that a person can really rely
on” (McKee 2003:133). Other anthropologists have theorized
that sierran mistrust of outsiders is a result of the difficulty
of travel in the sierra compared to the ease of using rivers as
highways on the coast (Scrimshaw 1979).
Coastal residents are usually imagined as more open to
outsiders and more fluid in their family formation, thus more
welcoming of adoption (Verdesoto et al. 1995), whereas in
the urban sierra adoption has never enjoyed much accep-
tance (Weismantel 1995). The demographic data bear out
these differences in family structure. In the urban popu-
lar sector, the incidence of children living with adults be-
sides their natal parents is higher in the coastal cities of
Guayaquil and Esmeraldas than the sierran cities of Quito
and Riobamba (Garcia and Mauro 1992). I asked all of the
patients I encountered if they would ever consider adopting
a child. In Quito, the overwhelming response to this question
was negative. Many Quiteño patients responded empathi-
cally that an adopted child is “not of my own blood. Not of
my own body.” Those patients who did not immediately re-
coil at the idea would explain, “It’s a nice idea to help others,
but I want my own,” going on to list the possible problems
an adopted baby could have: “born of drug addicts,” “born
of criminals,” “born of Indians,” or “born black,” all signs
of heavily policed race and class boundaries. In a related
vein, when it came to egg donation, many Quiteño IVF pa-
tients in need of donor eggs wanted to use known family
donors. Most Guayaquileño IVF patients, however, had con-
sidered pursuing adoption, and most of the practitioners in
Guayaquil were quite positive about the idea of adoption
and sometimes counseled patients to try to adopt.
Attitudes toward adoption, and egg donation, in the IVF
clinics of Quito and Guayaquil, often mirrored local kin-
ship reckoning. In Quito, patients understood relatedness
as formed through substances and inherited traits such as
blood and genes. Patients who used genetic understandings
of relatedness usually imagined families as constituted by
a limited set of known relations of the same substance and
race. In Guayaquil, patients and practitioners tended to see
embryos as more autonomous, able to become part of new
families. The IVF patients and clinicians I met in Guayaquil
shared with their practitioners an emphasis on the environ-
ment and education as molding the person. Genes for these
patients were explicitly de-emphasized, which perhaps is
linked to the fact that it was many of these same patients
that were willing to entertain the idea of adoption and the
use of anonymous donor eggs. This willingness also created
the context for the donation of embryos to other patients be-
fore cryopreservation became available in Guayaquil. Before
embryos could be frozen, extra embryos were problematic
in Guayaquil because for most patients and practitioners
embryos were conceptualized within a framework of “life.”
The problem was what to do with the extra embryos left over
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after embryo transfer. The solution, when possible, was the
immediate donation of these embryos to other couples.
Although cryopreservation further ameliorated the
problem of life for many Guayaquileño patients and practi-
tioners, the addition of cryopreservation to the technology
of IVF in 1998 created new ethical anxieties for Ecuadorians
participating in kin ethics. In Quito, among practitioners, as
well as nearly half of the patients, the existence of extra em-
bryos provoked no concern about their fate until cryopreser-
vation became a possibility. Cryopreservation instigated the
fear that somehow these frozen embryos might be illegiti-
mately moved out of the bounds of their natal family. These
anxieties had less to do with the status of embryos as “live
persons” than with kin obligations that construct embryos as
members of one particular family at one particular temporal
moment. For those IVF practitioners and patients, the no-
tion of “embryo donation” was untenable. It was preferable
to discard embryos rather than freeze them. The ethical con-
cerns cut across class by region. Those Quiteño patients who
voiced concerns about embryo cryopreservation had a vari-
ety of income and education levels. The thought of mixture
with others, from other races or classes, was what disturbed
them. The practitioners across the two regions were from
more uniform economic and educational backgrounds, but
there was a clear regional divide in their stance toward em-
bryo cryopreservation.
Life ethics—Generic embryos, alive, and “frozen
for the future”
The practitioners at Dr. Vroit’s large clinic in Guayaquil
were proud of their new cryopreservation program that had
started about six months before my observations. They all
independently mentioned how enthusiastic their patients
were about the possibility of freezing extra embryos. Prac-
titioners saw cost reduction as one benefit of cryopreserva-
tion. They told me how patients, especially those with few
economic resources, could save money with cryopreserva-
tion because they would not have to pay for another ovarian
stimulation if a second cycle was necessary. Dr. Castillo, the
biologist at Dr. Vroit’s clinic, was concerned, however, that
they had had less opportunity to freeze embryos than they
had anticipated. Practitioners at this clinic had stimulated
patients relatively lightly in the past. Recently, they had be-
gun a somewhat increased drug regime but still had fewer
embryos to freeze than they hoped for.
Sandra, the coordinator of the IVF program at Dr. Vroit’s
clinic, explained why, in the past, they had always tried to
stimulate patients lightly so there would be fewer extra em-
bryos. Before their cryopreservation program began, she was
always “uncomfortable with the elimination of a good em-
bryo because of my religion.” She expressed relief that sci-
ence had advanced so they could now cryopreserve embryos.
I asked her why her religion was against the elimination of
embryos and she explained:
Because the embryos are life. We know that. The minute
we manipulate [embryos] they think we are playing with
life. That we think we are Gods that can form creatures.
But I don’t see it like this. It’s not like I believe that I am
God. I do it because I think I can help someone. I don’t
do it to destroy life. It’s true; as they say to create a life
we needed to destroy the embryos that remained. But
I don’t only look at the bad part. And if I don’t do it, it’s
not allowing a child to be created.
Nancı́, one of the laboratory biologists at Dr. Vroit’s
clinic, told me that all of their patients had been enthusias-
tic about the possibility of embryo cryopreservation. I men-
tioned that in the Quiteño clinics I had met patients who
were reluctant to freeze embryos. She thought for a moment
and told me that it must be because those patients were wor-
ried about what happens to the embryos when they defrost
because they have read more about the process.20 I found
it noteworthy that Nancı́ could only imagine that patients
could have problems with cryopreservation on technical—
not ethical—grounds. In her mind, cryopreservation solved
the ethical problem of life.
For these IVF participants, cryopreservation specifically
answered church concerns about the preservation of life.
In my discussion with Dr. Vega, the staff psychiatrist at Dr.
Vroit’s clinic, he told me:
I understand that [disposing of embryos] is a waste of
life. The church experts say it is considered human life,
the new cell, and the union of sperm with the egg. To
avoid this controversy you can say to the church “look,
we are freezing these embryos” and after ten years you
can revive them and they continue being the same be-
ing. Nothing is lost. Nothing.
Dr. Vega emphasized how embryos remain the same
being, even over ten years. The temporal suspension in-
volved in freezing was not problematic to the psychologist
because frozen embryos are alive but not yet part of a fam-
ily that might have moved through time without them. In-
stead, the beingness of the embryo is what is of concern
for the psychologist, in one way matching the concerns of
the Catholic Church that life is preserved. Although these
practitioners saw cryopreservation as a way out of the life
quandary, they are not mollifying official Catholic doctrine,
which also stands against cryopreservation. Apparently, the
church’s concern about the lack of dignity a human embryo
might experience being left on ice was not as pressing for the
particular Ecuadorian version of life ethics.
For Eliana and Samuel, a middle-class couple from
Guayaquil who had two-week-old triplets through IVF, cry-
opreservation was seen as offering a scientific way out of the
dilemma of life as posed by the church. They explained to
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me that the church thinks embryos are life, and they agreed.
Eliana explained, “Because, yes, already it is made. The life.
And if it is in the place where it should be, that is inside the
uterus, then it begins. It forms to go giving more life.” Samuel
explained, “The science continues advancing . . . they, the
scientists can give a future, with freezing, that was thrown
out.” This couple had undergone IVF right before the clinic
began their cryopreservation program. Their IVF cycle re-
sulted in six extra embryos, which Eliana wished they had
been able to freeze because of her fear that something could
have happened to the triplets in utero or shortly after birth:
If the pregnancy fails or if they are born but fail then this
is the option of the other embryos that are frozen in the
machine. I would have done it at least for a year I read
that they can freeze [the embryos] with contracts for a
year. Here they are our children. They are frozen for the
future. [emphasis mine]
In their reflections on cryopreservation, Eliana and
Samuel imagined cryopreservation as providing a sort of in-
surance against the possible failure of pregnancy or birth.
The issue of time passed was not a concern.
Until cryopreservation became available in Guayaquil,
both clinics had offered embryo donation to anonymous
couples as one way to prevent embryo disposal and pre-
serve life. This was a much more haphazard way to save life,
however, because the embryos had to be transferred rapidly.
A patient who was at the right moment of her endometrial
cycle had to be immediately on hand.21 Before cryopreser-
vation became available in Quiteño clinics, embryos had, as
far as I knew, not been donated to other couples.
One wealthy Guayaquileño couple, Maria and Victor,
used both donation and cryopreservation as a means to pre-
serve the life of embryos. The couple, who had undergone
IVF four times, had donated their extra embryos on their
third attempt. Maria told me: “We heard that this woman
couldn’t ovulate. The staff explained this woman needed
help like we needed help.” Their extra embryos went to this
woman, much to Maria and Victor’s relief. They were thrilled
that the embryos did not “die.” On their fourth round of IVF,
Maria and Victor’s clinic had begun a cryopreservation pro-
gram, and they were able to freeze their extra embryos, which
they saw as a scientific answer to the problem of embryo
death. For Maria and Victor, as their donation illustrated,
embryos should be circulated among other families to pre-
serve their lives.
Dr. Castillo also told me how he and other clinic staff had
struggled with the question of the church and its condem-
nation of IVF. To minimize the impact of church critique, Dr.
Castillo took to thinking of the fertilized cell masses as pre-
embryos and pointed out that many miscarriages happen
naturally, but now cryopreservation alleviated the quandary
of embryo disposal. Dr. Castillo viewed cryopreservation in
a positive light, as an answer to many problems posed by IVF.
At one point he said, “I prefer to freeze embryos; no están en
el tacho al menos están en el tanque” [better that they are in
the tank than the dustbin; lit. they are not in the dustbin, at
least they are in the tank]. This statement, proverblike in its
economy of expression, exemplifies the life ethics approach
to embryo cryopreservation. The most salient characteriza-
tion of the embryos is as “alive.” The embryo’s life is at stake,
not its status as family member. In addition, embryos are
interchangeable and generic. They do not necessarily have
ties to a particular family. They can be circulated through
embryo donation, and their lives can be suspended “for the
future,” as long as they are preserved.
Before I move on to describing patients and practition-
ers participating in kin ethics, I want to point out two specific
features of these Ecuadorian embryos that become apparent
when comparing them to English embryos as characterized
by Catherine Waldby. Waldby describes how biovalue is har-
nessed through the ability to temporally manipulate tissue
fragments extricated from the body (Waldby 2002). The fact
that embryos can be frozen for indefinite amounts of time
allows for their controlled circulation. This capacity to store
embryos indefinitely is one of the attributes that makes cry-
opreservation so appealing for Ecuadorian practitioners and
patients who see embryos as alive. Although extra embryos
had little or no value when they had to be disposed of or im-
mediately transferred to another woman, they became more
desirable when they could be kept in perpetuity. But as we
shall see, the manipulation of time is exactly what made cry-
opreservation so disturbing for other Ecuadorian patients
and practitioners. Within kin ethics, extra embryos had no
value before the advent of cryopreservation, although after-
ward they took on a negative value because they threatened
the boundaries of family groupings.
However, Waldby’s insights could have been more nu-
anced if she had compared English embryos with embryos
elsewhere. She argues that for those who oppose stem cell re-
search, “the life of the embryo is biographical, the beginning
point of a human narrative that should be allowed to run
its social course” (Waldby 2002:313). If we carefully exam-
ine statements made by those who think of embryos as life,
such as Ecuadorian IVF patients and practitioners, or Bush,
the actual biography of embryos does not appear to be their
concern. The desire to save the human lives of embryos does
not stem from the desire to activate a particular biography
but, instead, is more the call to preserve human life in an
impersonal, almost bureaucratic, sense. Proponents of life
ethics value life, but life in the abstract, interchangeable and
bare, unencumbered with ties to the living.
In the next section, I describe Ecuadorian patients and
practitioners whose embryos stand outside life debates. For
them, embryos are indeed connected to biographies, not of
individuals but of families. These embryos are the opposite
of anonymous. They are not necessarily alive, but they are
richly imbricated within a kin group with its own history
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and race and class status to preserve, and for this reason
their individual biographies need to be curtailed.
Kin ethics—Curtailing embryo circulation
My discussions with IVF practitioners and some patients in
Quito about embryos made it abundantly clear that there
is nothing natural about configuring embryos as life. For
Ecuadorians enrolled in kin ethics, life was not the primary
concern in imagining the proper fate for embryos. Among
these IVF participants, discarding extra embryos was not
cause for alarm, and it was only the technological possi-
bility of cryopreservation that made embryos problematic
because of the possibility of mixture with others and the
temporal discontinuity that could arise between frozen em-
bryos and the rest of their family members. This was es-
pecially apparent among laboratory practitioners in Quito.
Using a highly moral language, these practitioners would tell
me how patients “abandoned” their frozen embryos, never
returning to claim or transfer them. Likewise, Quiteño pa-
tients frequently voiced concerns that cryopreserving their
embryos would allow practitioners to surreptitiously move
them out of the bounds of their natal family.
Even in the IVF clinics in Ecuador that had the technol-
ogy to freeze embryos, cryopreservation for some was the
exception not the norm. When I returned from visiting an
IVF clinic in Argentina, I told the practitioners at Dr. Moli-
nas’s clinic in Quito that the biologists at a clinic in Buenos
Aries froze all embryos, regardless of quality, because of con-
cerns about life.22 The physicians and biologists at Dr. Moli-
nas’s clinic laughed when they heard of these efforts to save
feo embryos, saying “what a waste of time and money.” In
addition, Diego, one of the biologists, was concerned about
potential abandonment of any frozen embryos by their fam-
ilies, whether bonito (pretty) or feo. One morning, as Diego
peeled (cleaned) some newly aspirated eggs in the darkened
laboratory, he remarked that when he trained in Brazil some-
times the clinicians would aspirate 35–40 eggs at a time, this,
in contrast to Ecuadorian clinics that usually harvest from
4 to 10. When I asked about this difference, he explained
that Brazilian doctors give patients more fertility stimulation
drugs. His clinic did not administer a high dosage because
“then you would have all these embryos to freeze . . . and
couples just abandon them.” The sentiment of this offhand
comment did not match Diego’s remarks in more official mo-
ments, when he told me that he froze all embryos of good
quality, and that he froze embryos in 90 percent of the cases.
Cryopreservation for Diego, as with most other practition-
ers, was a sign of technical advancement, and he disparaged
clinics without a cryopreservation program. Diego called
clinics without cryopreservation technology “contra la vida”
because extra embryos would have to be thrown out. But I
had often witnessed Diego dispose of embryos. In fact, by
my count Diego only froze embryos 30 percent of the time,
and only when there was at least more than one embryo left
over after transfer. On all other occasions he discarded the
remainder.
In Dr. Hidalgo’s clinic in Quito, Antonia, the biologist,
told me that they have cryopreserved embryos only 23 times
in the three years since they obtained the equipment to do so.
Like Diego, she explained they do suave (soft) stimulations,
so there were fewer embryos to freeze. For Antonia, the desir-
ability of fewer embryos did not stem from a worry that there
is “divine punishment for what we are doing.” What worried
her was “the future of frozen embryos, because the parents
here are frivolous and don’t think about them responsibly.” I
asked her, “Why worry about them at all?” and she told me,
“Because the embryos are cells with future potential. They
are going to be children. . . . And for this single reason, [the
parents] who make the decision to freeze them and leave
them have to be responsible about what happens to them.”
Freezing embryos was not something Antonia took
lightly. Her anxiety about the procedure arose not from em-
bryo death but, instead, from the embryos’ potential aban-
donment by patients who she already considered parents
with responsibilities to specific children. In Antonia’s view,
frozen embryos signaled future children that might be aban-
doned, not current or future life that must be preserved.
After an embryo transfer one afternoon, I noticed An-
tonia at the microscope placing something in a petri dish
that she had taken out of the back bottom of the incubator. I
asked about it, and she told me that this dish was filled with
unfertilized eggs and unused, extra embryos left over after
transfers. She kept one of these dishes for about a year, de-
positing the extra embryos from every patient’s cycle into a
dish in which they reside together until it was time to ster-
ilize the lab. It was in this dish, after they lost the potential
to become children, that patients’ gametes were allowed to
mingle. Antonia used them as display embryos for visitors,
instead of removing the patients’ embryos, slated for trans-
fer, from the optimal conditions of the incubator.23 In addi-
tion, Antonia described how she is not capable of throwing
these embryos out.
Are they life? Yes. Like bacteria and I would be sad throw-
ing out certain bacteria that I worked on? The embryos
are special because they are of my patients. I am a biol-
ogist, not a doctor. I don’t connect to them because they
are human.
These dead embryos are “special,” “they are her pa-
tients,” and she “has worked on them.” They were life, but life
like bacterial life, not human. What made them worthy of her
time was the specificity of her connection to them as work
objects, and their connection to particular patients, provid-
ing a view of what is deemed worthy of care and emotion,
expanded beyond the human.24
For these biologists, the specialness of embryos does
not revolve around their status as alive or dead. Letting the
189
American Ethnologist  Volume 34 Number 1 February 2007
embryos die in a dish was much less problematic for Antonia
then freezing them. As she told me, “Having them and having
them be dead is better then freezing. I prefer to have a dead
child than a disappeared child not knowing what happened
to it.” These biologists would rather have had fewer eggs to
fertilize, or would rather throw out a few extra embryos than
leave an embryo in a state of suspended temporal potential,
possibly abandoned by their parents.
When I interviewed Dr. Castro, the clinic manager at Dr.
Hidalgo’s clinic, she claimed that their lab (meaning Antonia)
never threw out fertilized embryos. I immediately thought of
the dish of extra embryos sitting in the incubator. It was true
that they were not discarded at first, but they were not im-
planted, either. These practitioners’ attitudes made it clear
to me that regardless of their own concerns about the kinship
of embryos, they were well aware how life ethics has so per-
meated discussions of embryos that they had represented
themselves and their laboratories as maintaining the life of
embryos. Given the Catholic Church’s position on embryo
death, and globalizing debates about life, this is hardly sur-
prising. Even with this proclamation of care, however, these
biologists’ avoidance of cryopreservation and characteriza-
tion of embryos stood in stark relief to those biologists who
saw embryos as alive. Remember Dr. Castillo’s comment that
“I prefer to freeze. Better in the tank than the dustbin.” One
could imagine Diego and Antonia reversing the sentiment,
“Better in the dustbin than the tank.”
Ethical patients
Although lab biologists worried that patients might aban-
don their embryos, patients with concerns about freezing
embryos were anxious about the potential for clinic staff to
move the embryos outside the bounds of circumscribed kin
relations, and about resulting family dysyncrony if they came
to have both live and frozen children. These patients were for
the most part unconcerned with the fate of their extra em-
bryos that might be thrown out until I pushed them to think
about this issue. When asked directly, many of these patients
told me that embryos are life, but that did not mean that their
lives must be preserved at all costs. Some patients, in fact,
like Ximena, one of the few Afro-Ecuadorian IVF patients I
encountered, declared that embryos are not yet life. “Em-
bryos, they are not yet . . . well maybe they are life when they
are four months or five. Maybe they could be. But embryos?
No?” Although life was not a major concern among patients
such as Ximena, the specter of cryopreservation could pro-
voke strong reaction without much prodding. One patient,
Tatiana, explained:
The manipulation that exists can really affect families.
I heard this is why some priests are against it, for this
manipulation. There is no care taken here because of
the lack of ethics. Maybe in other places there is more
professional ethics. Here, no. Here still it can be a sale.
They might use [my embryos] like this. They would be
misused, put in another person.
In this case, even though the church has condemned IVF
and cryopreservation outright, Tatiana, an upper-middle-
class Quiteño woman, could only imagine that the church
finds IVF objectionable because of the possibility that uneth-
ical doctors might give her embryos to unknown persons.
Inez, a middle-class doctor, one of the few patients from
Guayaquil who had reservations about freezing, also con-
ceived of kin relations as more important than life:
The embryos that are thrown out, it’s like an abortion for
them [the church]. That is you could think of it as abor-
tion because it’s already an embryo, that is it is already
a life. But they should destroy it before another person
uses it. Freezing that doesn’t seem good to me. I believe
it’s better to destroy them. In my case if I had embryos
and we had them to donate to someone. . . . No, it’s bet-
ter to destroy them. The truth is that I don’t know how
long they can have them frozen. If they have the same
capacity, it seems to me that fresh [is better].
For Inez, destroying embryos was better than cryonic
suspension. Although patients and practitioners who ad-
vocated life ethics saw no problem—ethical or technical—
in the long-term suspension of embryos, Inez worried that
frozen embryos are not the same over time, their specificity
to a particular movement in a family would be lost. To her,
they were not interchangeable life; they were specific, related
embryos that should not be given to “another person.”
Fernando, a working-class Quiteño patient at Dr.
Molina’s, who was in the early stages of an IVF cycle with
his wife, agreed with the church that embryos are life, but
he had concerns about kin that overrode life in deciding the
fate of extra embryos.
They are life, yes they are human life, and so it would be
ugly to put them in the trash. They told us that some-
times there are couples that cannot have children, and
they want what is donated. But, in contrast, my wife
and I think that if they are your cells and my cells then
maybe they are going to remove some similarity from
you or me. Or, not of us, but of our children. And what
if after a time we see them in the street? Another one of
my children with another couple. It is going to be very
hard. But until now we don’t know what to do if they
have them [extra embryos]. We are still indecisive.
Fernando was struggling to interpret embryos. Clearly,
the thought of embryos as life had some claim on his imagi-
nation, but what concerned him more was the possibility of
embryos moving outside of his family.
This concern that he might run into the child produced
from his embryos was indicative of concerns of many people
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in Ecuador. For instance, Dr. Leon, the director of another
clinic, thought that people should not donate embryos in
Quito because of Quito’s small size and the chances of meet-
ing a child “on the street” were high. In both Fernando and Dr.
Leon’s scenarios, the “street” plays a role as a site of potential
hazard, involving the possibility of mixtures with strangers.
Catching sight of one’s embryo on the street would be an
incomprehensible experience, a stranger and one’s child at
the same time.
After conducting interviews with IVF patients over sev-
eral months, I found that I could identify a patient’s ethical
priorities sometimes even before I asked them about em-
bryo cryopreservation. If they brought up their fears about
embryo donation on their own, it usually meant that they
would feel negatively about cryopreservation when I would
ask about it. For these patients, cryopreservation could eas-
ily lead to the surreptitious donation of their embryos to
someone else, preying on prevalent fears about the lack of
ethics in Ecuador, and emphasizing their robust sense of
family boundaries. Javier, an upper-middle-class Quiteño
man who had already undergone three cycles with his wife
Lourdes (also from Quito), told me that he thought freezing
was a good idea in case you needed to do it again. But he
added that,
J: I am scared as well that the doctors could use the
embryos in another way, for another fertilization
for someone else. There is no legislation here that
obliges them to effectively control them. That they
respect them. They are only guided by [their own]
ethics.
E. R.: Would you think of donating them to someone
else?
J: No, because they are your children, that is more
than little embryos. You don’t know who they are
that would have them.
In Javier’s view, the lack of regulation of reproductive
medicine in Ecuador was threatening embryos as his own
children. He was not worried that lack of regulation would
threaten embryos as abstract life. Isabel, an upper-class
Quiteña, explained, “You don’t know in whose hands they
will fall. You have to assure that this creature [child] is go-
ing to be well, and with donation you can’t be given that
certainty.”
These comments speak to the issue of trust between
physicians and patient in Ecuadorian IVF, or lack of it. Pa-
tients enjoyed a paternalistic relationship with their doctors,
sometimes revering them as near to God. Especially in Quito,
the relationships that patients had with their doctors empha-
sized personal connections over bureaucratic rules. Patients
trusted these doctors to maneuver “above the law” for them,
like God or a parent. This style of informal trust allowed pa-
tients to imagine that in other circumstances the same doc-
tor might intervene on the behalf of someone else, comman-
deering their own embryos for the sake of another patient.
And God provided
For those patients involved in kin ethics, cryopreservation
posed the question of family, not life. In many of these cases,
it was God that provided the answer. As I explained above,
these were patients who were more “traditionally” Catholic.
For them, the fact that the church disapproved of IVF meant
little when they had a more personal relationship with saints
and the Virgin Mary, or with God, who could affect outcomes
on their behalf. Several patients recounted very similar nar-
ratives in which they had not wanted to freeze embryos and,
fortunately, God “blessed them” with only the amount of
embryos that could be transferred. For these patients, it was
cryopreservation that they imagined God wished to avoid.
During her IVF cycle, Laura, a middle-class Quiteña woman,
and her husband had talked about what they would do
about cryopreservation: “I wouldn’t have wanted to freeze,
and then God gave me only those that I needed. I didn’t
want more. It gave me peace that they did not have the
possibility to continue the process to freeze. Three were
good and the rest were bad. They didn’t have to freeze them.
Thanks to God.”
Berta, an upper-middle-class woman from Ambato in
the sierra to the south of Quito, also attributed the fact that
there were no extra embryos at her transfer to God’s inter-
vention: “With freezing I would have been left with my living
children [she already had two older children] and my frozen
ones there, and in five years the doctor would have discarded
them. And I don’t want to do this again. And I believe that
God facilitated here, because only four formed out of the
six [eggs]. Two didn’t form and they put the four inside me.”
Berta’s anxiety about freezing embryos had to do with the
temporal suspension of particular embryos as children, in
relation to a specific family moving through time, not a con-
cern that their lives were at stake.
God also helped patients overcome some of the compli-
cations of actually having frozen embryos. In the summer of
2000, during a few months of preliminary fieldwork, I talked
with a young, middle-class Quiteño woman, Vanessa, after
observing her aspiration and embryo transfer. At the trans-
fer there were seven good-quality embryos. Vanessa agreed
to the recommendation of the clinic doctors that they im-
plant four and freeze three. A few days later she told me she
was worried about what would happen “with those three
embrioncitos,” the extras. Vanessa had apprehensions that if
she was now pregnant the doctors would ask her to donate
the frozen three, and the embryos could “have this other
señora even though I know they are only mine.” She contin-
ued, “It will also serve in the happiness of another person
that doesn’t have this possibility,” deciding out loud that she
would donate them if asked.
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A week afterward, Vanessa had a positive pregnancy test.
When I returned to Quito two years later I heard that Vanessa
had lost that pregnancy and then had the three frozen em-
bryos implanted. This transfer was not successful. A few
months later, she underwent a new IVF cycle and got preg-
nant with quadruplets, who were nine months old when I
saw her again. At my visit her small house was crammed with
bassinets and other baby paraphernalia. Even so, Vanessa
launched into an angst-filled tale about those three frozen
embrioncitos from two years earlier. Obviously, the thought
of these three embryos still haunted Vanessa, even though
four small, sickly looking babies now surrounded her on the
bed, demanding attention. She described how when she was
pregnant the first time she said to herself:
My God! What am I going to do with my other chil-
dren [the frozen embryos]? I always said to my mother,
“Mama, what will happen?” I told her to donate [them]
would be like abandoning my child. I told her I don’t
like this idea. Then when I lost my child [the first mis-
carriage] my mother told me: “It’s for the best. It’s from
God I tell you. You were very worried about the babies,
the frozen ones.” So then they [implanted the frozen em-
bryos] but I was doing [so] badly emotionally. I believe
that I rejected them when they were in. They implanted
but I didn’t stay pregnant.
Vanessa explained how relieved she was that there were
no frozen embryos left to worry about. “There won’t be other
children that are going to be mine and that someone else
could have.” Reversing her position of two years earlier, she
told me: “I understand that there are people that can’t have
babies, because I suffered a lot in this, but other people would
have the embryos and I don’t like that much.” Implanting the
embryos alleviated Vanessa’s dismay that she had potentially
abandoned her children to strangers, even though she re-
garded her poor emotional state as causing their death. Ad-
ditionally, in Vanessa’s narrative, God was portrayed as more
concerned with the potential of abandoned children than
preserving the life of embryos. As for the majority of Quiteño
practitioners and many of the patients, Vanessa placed em-
bryos in a category requiring an ethics of kin responsibility,
not an ethics of life.25
The fear of abandonment involved in kin ethics creates
an embryo that has a very specific temporality. Recall Dr.
Vega’s argument that frozen embryos remain the same being,
even after long-term cryopreservation. In contrast, within
kin ethics, embryos are not understood as interchangeable
life that can be suspended through time. An embryo circu-
lated among strangers or frozen for ten years threatens the
embryo’s status as a family member. In life ethics, cryopreser-
vation and normative embryo donation represented the po-
tential future saved or ensured. Within kin ethics, the only
potential was that of the potential for child abandonment,
exemplified by Vanessa’s explanation that God preferred the
death of embryos to the abandonment of cryopreservation.
IVF biologists participated in worries about abandonment
as well when they expressed how they did not like the re-
sponsibility of tending other people’s children, even those
residing in pipettes and stored in cryopreservation tanks.
Cryopreservation represented a failure to fulfill obligations
to one’s kind. Within kin ethics, embryos are not transferable
to other parties; they are unique in the way that embryos in
life ethics are indistinguishable, which allows life to be cir-
culated to be preserved.
Personhood—Lives and connections
Within these two contrasting sets of ethical constellations,
life ethics and kin ethics, different formulations of how new
persons should be properly brought into existence can be
discerned. For Ecuadorian patients and practitioners who
shared in life ethics, any talk of family linkages took a back
seat to the imperative of keeping embryos alive by any
means. For those who shared in kin ethics, embryos are un-
derstood as constituted through family relations, and less as
individual human persons-to-be. These two understandings
of embryos parallel Marilyn Strathern’s discussion of the dif-
ferences between contemporary bourgeois English kinship
and kinship among the Hagen in Papua New Guinea.
Within life ethics, the embryo is an autonomous entity
in which the essence of that entity, life, is the object of moral
concern and evaluation, not its individual characteristics.
These embryos are more like the individual person as de-
scribed by Strathern for English kinship, in which a baby is
a new person that can exist outside its relations (Strathern
1992). In their microscopic state it is especially easy to see
embryos as devoid of all ties, social or biological. Embryos,
for participants in life ethics, are alive but interchangeable,
bare but dignified. Life ethics regards embryonic actors in the
short term, saving the life of one embryo, instead of main-
taining lineage and alliance in the long term. An embryo can
be circulated outside a family; it can be frozen through time.
None of these actions changes its essence as alive. These
embryos are seen as having future potential in any home. At
the Bush press conference with which I started this article,
the older children in attendance wore T-shirts that declared
“Former Embryos” (see Figure 1). These “former embryos”
were presented as easily disconnected from their genetic
families and adopted by other couples. Within life ethics,
life can trump “genetic truth,” or other forms of connection,
in determining personhood.
Within life ethics, the primary duty is to preserve life;
thus, cryopreservation is a positive development. Within kin
ethics, cryopreservation is problematic because of the fact
that this technology brings with it the possibility that the
bounds of a particular family could be breached through
abandonment and illegitimate circulation of persons who
are family.26 An embryo is not an autonomous individual
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Figure 1. These two “former embryos” were photographed at a White House press conference, at which President George W. Bush spoke out against expanding
federal financing for stem cell research. The boys had been cryopreserved as embryos and “adopted” through the Christian organization Snowflakes. Although
Snowflakes and George W. Bush emphasize the uniqueness of every human embryo, the boys, presumably twins, were made to look identical, with matching
T-shirts, pants, and haircuts. Courtesy of AP Images.
in the bourgeois sense but one formed by its role and
positionality in a family, as Strathern describes for New
Guinea, where “persons embody their relationship with oth-
ers” (Strathern 1992:65). For the Ecuadorian patients who
shared in kin ethics, cryopreserved embryos were “unfin-
ished business.”27 Persons within kin ethics are formed in
situ within kin groups, not individually. The trouble with
cryopreservation is not life or death but the suspension and
possible future circulation of one’s family member. Person-
hood in this case is not derived from individual beingness or
a value placed on life but is socially performative and pro-
cessual. Effectively, kin ethics acts to prevent the circulation
of embryos by granting embryos personhood through kin-
ship, whereas life ethics fosters circulation through imbuing
embryos with personhood through life.
My delineation of different Ecuadorian practices in-
volving cryopreservation might be taken as a kind of social
evolutionary argument in which traditional Quito has not
evolved modern understandings of bourgeois personhood
whereas liberal Guayaquil has. But this delineation would
mask many contradictions. The differences exhibited be-
tween Quiteño and Guayaquileño cryopreservation and the
difference between both of these approaches and what we
assume to be the case for North America or Europe demon-
strate something else other than unilinear social evolution.
In Guayaquil, personhood might more closely match that
of European bourgeois personhood, but long-standing ap-
proval of adoption has provoked an antipathy to genetic rea-
soning in Guayaquil. Guayaquileño concerns about the life
of embryos come from influential Catholic teaching about
the sanctity of human life. In this way it is more pious and
enlightened. For those participating in life ethics, embryos
evoke “life,” but they are often devoid of the genetic ties that
many North Americans see as connecting embryos to the
world of the living. In fact, modern substances like genes
were often dismissed as markers of connection, a dismissal
that made adoption and embryo donation possible, even
embraced.
In “traditional” Quito, however, action around embryos
was not necessarily predicated on the modern discourse of
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“life itself.” Although Guayaquileño patients and practition-
ers acted to preserve the life of embryos, the hesitation to
freeze embryos on the part of many practitioners and pa-
tients in Quito did not privilege church arguments about
the sacred life of embryos, and, in fact, some Quiteño pa-
tients believe that it must be cryopreservation, not IVF, that
the church finds objectionable. Within kin ethics, genetic
discourses played a significant role in understandings of
persons constituted by relations. The fact that genetic rea-
soning makes sense in the context of a “traditional” kinship
of alliance in kin ethics reminds us that it can be difficult
to untangle where modern biological “truths” begin and
long-standing European “folk biologies” end (Franklin 1997;
Schneider 1980).
The circulation of life
This article has compared divergent approaches to embryos
in Ecuador to better-known North American and European
debates about the life of embryos. The expansion of the IVF
industry has fostered similar yet specifically local debates
about the status of these entities throughout the world.
In some Muslim countries where “the right to life” from
conception is not at issue, it appears that maintaining
familial boundaries is also of great concern. Marcia In-
horn has described the reaction of an Egyptian Muslim
couple confronted with extra embryos after undergoing
IVF in a Los Angeles clinic. The IVF staff gave the couple
three options: freezing, destroying, or donation. The wife
explained, “We said, ‘destroy.’ It is our religion.” This couple
feared that donation would “inevitably lead to an immoral
and genealogically bewildering [and possibly incestuous]
mixture of relations” (Inhorn 2003:86). Alternately, in India,
Aditya Bharadwaj describes how embryos for the most part
exist outside of life debates. However, Indian embryos do
not appear to be implicated within discourses of kinship
and alliance, either. Couples with extra embryos routinely
donate their embryos for stem cell research. Perhaps, in
India, embryos are not imagined as entities that have ties
to particular families and, thus, require an entirely different
model of how embryos mean in India. Regardless, the
consequences of these two approaches are different. The
Muslim couple wanted their extra embryos taken out of
circulation and destroyed while, in India, the willingness of
couples to donate their extra embryos is currently fueling
India’s burgeoning stem cell industry (Bharadwaj 2005).
In Western Europe, North America, and in other areas
within European liberal traditions (like Latin America), the
post–WWII posing of the debate about “bare” life also has
particular consequences. By enveloping embryos in debates
about life, they have become transferable. If they are life, they
should be donated to other couples, and if they are not, they
can be used in research. Both answers to the question of life
have reshaped action and the generation of biovalue. This
debate obscures other ways of situating embryos, even in
North America. In fact, after a slew of articles in the New
York Times about embryo adoption, as advocated by Bush
and right-to-life proponents as a solution to the “thorny”
problem of extra embryos, the New York Times ran an arti-
cle entitled “It’s Not So Easy to Adopt an Embryo” (Belluck
2005). It seems, according to the interviews that the reporter
conducted, that despite the incitement-to-life ethics of Bush
and embryo adoption agencies, few couples in the United
States with frozen embryos actually donate their embryos to
other couples, even if they were initially enthusiastic about
the prospect. A version of kin ethics appears to be at work.
In the New York Times article, couples explained that they
are uncomfortable with having their genetic children raised
by someone else, or with the possibility that a child born
from donated embryos might wonder why they were not the
embryos chosen to be raised by their “real” parents.28
I cannot draw a firm conclusion from a lone newspa-
per article, but one difference between U.S. and Ecuado-
rian versions of kin ethics might be that the U.S. version
had little concern about the consequences of cryopreser-
vation itself; North Americans trusted their practitioners to
leave their embryos frozen in perpetuity and not circulate
them surreptitiously.29 For Ecuadorian patients, cryopreser-
vation entails problems with the potential for illicit circu-
lation of frozen relations and the ability to unsettle familial
time. Whatever their differences, patients in Ecuador and
the United States with concerns about the circulation of em-
bryos seem to have little voice given that the competing eth-
ical debate about life is so loud. The life–not life debate over
embryos is recognizable almost everywhere, and it has been
scaled globally while we might say that other ways to situate
embryos remain more local. For example, in India, in vitro
embryos cannot be created for the sole purpose of stem cell
research. This mandate is in place to placate the North Amer-
ican market for stem cell research that is concerned with life
debates (Bharadwaj 2005). In India, then, research protocols
are organized around foreign concerns about “life itself.”
In the United States, the federal government has never
sponsored a single research grant for IVF. In the early days of
IVF, life debates effectively shut down the possibility of the
government ability to recognize and regulate the industry,
which made the explosion of the private IVF industry pos-
sible (Marantz Henig 2003). Now, 25 years later, extra em-
bryos, new entities created through the ubiquity of IVF, have
become a symbol for a similar debate about life. And again
the debate in the United States promises to keep research
on stem cells very much alive within the private sector, less
regulated than in nations like England and France.
Ecuador, of course, is a very different place than the
unregulated zones of the United States or India. It does not
currently have the scientific infrastructure to warrant the
interests of biocapital. But the local “life” rhetoric in Latin
America around embryos certainly mirrors global debates
194
Extra embryos  American Ethnologist
around free trade.30 There is a large controversy about the im-
plantation of multiple embryos within the Pan–Latin Amer-
ican IVF industry. The number of embryos transferred is
thought to be much too high because of the incidence of mul-
tiple pregnancies. Within logic of the “free trade” of embryos
that life ethics makes possible, the concern about the trans-
fer of multiple embryos could also be interpreted as akin to
embryo disposal. Transferring multiple embryos back into a
woman’s body keeps them in the family. It prevents the free
circulation of embryos to other families, “for the future,” or
for research. Both multiple embryo transfer and embryo dis-
posal constrict the movement of embryos in the larger world.
Embryos become bioavailable within the debate about
life–not life when they are situated as persons who should be
made available for activation. Although the Catholic Church
consistently continues to condemn IVF and the cryopreser-
vation of embryos as against the dignity of their humanity,
for other proponents of life, frozen embryos have become
valuable through the general free-floating call for “dignity.”
Complicating Kant’s distinction between “value” and “dig-
nity” (1949), it is this call to preserve the dignity of the generic
life of the embryo that in fact confers its value. Cryopreser-
vation technology makes embryos bioavailable. By freezing
time, embryos can become raw units that can be stored, ma-
nipulated, and exchanged when needed. In the North Amer-
ican context, the concerns of conservative Christians in this
case happen to align with that of private, unregulated indus-
try. Embryos are either persons (without bodies) or they are
not, but either way they can be disconnected from specific
families, free agents that can be moved within free markets.
Conclusion
The critical and ethnographic study of bioscience and tech-
nology in Ecuador offers the potential to understand how
“life” technologies are propagated and consumed within
very different religious and political–economic contexts, of-
ten in unanticipated ways. In Ecuador, new technological
practices have intersected with two ethical models of per-
sonhood so that the extra embryos produced by these prac-
tices also produce divergent responses to their creation.
These divergent responses demonstrate that embryos are
not universally embroiled in the politics of life, as has been
assumed in the majority of debates in Europe and North
America. The anxieties shared by some Ecuadorian practi-
tioners and patients around cryopreservation also illustrate
that in Ecuador, a Catholic country, institutional Catholic
concerns about life are not the only forces at work in deter-
mining ethical practice.
The examination of kin ethics and life ethics in Ecuador
allows for insights about local bioscientific practice. For in-
stance, in Ecuador the local clinical ecology of IVF is affected
by these ethical models, and the desire of some clinicians
to prevent the necessity of cryopreservation influences the
number of eggs stimulated and retrieved within IVF cycles
and the amount of hormones prescribed, purchased, and
consumed. By looking at these ethical models at work, it
is also possible to see that there is no one Ecuadorian ap-
proach to embryos. It is also important to remember that
my research was carried out at a particular moment. Even-
tually, more Ecuadorian IVF participants might become ac-
customed to cryopreservation and take on discourses of life
in regard to embryos, eventually obscuring the difference be-
tween these two ethical models and the divergent problems
they pose.
At the same time, the Ecuadorian embryo serves to sit-
uate and provincialize general North American approaches
to these technologies as emanating from a specific time and
place. The embryo is not a fixed thing but an object through
which local and globalized concerns about kinship and per-
sonhood and life are destabilized, articulated, and negoti-
ated. Comparisons between kinds of ethical embryos make
it easier to see how embryos situated within the debate about
life–not life allow for certain social arrangements and not
others. Contrasting the ethical discourses of kinship and life
clarifies the circulatory flows that life makes possible. For
some Ecuadorians, however, the embryo simply does not
carry an iconic resonance as “life” as it does in other sites,
and, at least for now, it is their suspension, not their death,
that makes them hard to keep.
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1. This organization, Snowflakes, connects couples with extra
embryos to those who “need” them.
2. Much of this scholarship overlaps with new kinship studies
propelled by social and technological developments, like assisted
conception and gay–lesbian social movements that have challenged
understandings of normative kinship (Borneman 2001; Butler 2002;
Clarke and Parsons 1997; Edwards 1999; Faubion 2001; Franklin and
McKinnon 2002; Franklin and Ragoné 1998; Ragoné and Twine 2000;
Strathern 1992; Weismantel 1995).
3. I found that there were a substantial number of patients with
very few economic resources in the IVF clinics in Ecuador. These
patients often went into extreme debt because of their involvement
with this set of technologies.
4. The attention paid to STS in developing nations is still mini-
mal, however. At STS conferences, the number of scholars engaged
in questions of science and technology outside of Europe, North
America, Australia, and Israel can usually be counted on less than
one hand.
5. My research mainly took place in IVF clinics, observing and
talking with practitioners and patients in waiting rooms, laborato-
ries, operating rooms, and patients’ recovery rooms. In addition, I
conducted over 130 formal interviews for the project, the majority
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with female infertility patients and, sometimes, their male partners.
I also conducted interviews with IVF practitioners, physicians, tech-
nicians, laboratory biologists, and staff at IVF clinics, as well as egg
and sperm donors, surrogate mothers, priests, lawyers, and bioethi-
cists. For an extended discussion of my findings, see Roberts 2006.
6. In IVF, practitioners vaginally remove a woman’s eggs from her
hormonally stimulated ovarian follicles, then laboratory technicians
combine these eggs in a petri dish with sperm. Resulting fertilized
eggs, or embryos, are transferred back into a woman’s uterus in the
hopes of implantation and pregnancy.
7. Waldby defines biovalue as “the yield of vitality produced by
the biotechnical reformulation of living processes to induce them to
increase or change their productivity along specified lines, intensify
their self-reproducing and self maintaining capacities” (2002:310).
8. With a population of roughly 300 million in the United States,
there is approximately one frozen embryo for every 750 people. In
the United Kingdom, with a population of 60 million, the ratio is
1/1,150, and in Spain with a population of 40 million, the ratio is
1/1,000, making the absolute differences less stark (Wade 2003).
9. A possible explanation for the low number of cryopreserved
embryos in Ecuadorian clinics might focus on economic conditions,
but economic explanations are at best partial. A cycle of IVF in the
United States can cost from $10,000 to $15,000, whereas a typical
IVF cycle in Ecuador costs from $3,000 to $6,000. However, given
Ecuador’s ongoing economic crisis since the mid-1990s, this price
is more prohibitive in Ecuador than it is for the majority of middle-
class IVF candidates in the United States. Many fewer Ecuadorian
IVF patients do repeat cycles if they do not succeed the first time be-
cause of the high costs. Cryopreserving embryos, which costs about
$700 in Ecuador, could be one way to cut the costs of subsequent
IVF cycles and could prompt patients to attempt more cycles. Some
doctors do promote embryo cryopreservation to patients for its abil-
ity to minimize costs in future cycles. This economic benefit did not
influence other practitioners to encourage cryopreservation, even
though more than half of the IVF clinics have the equipment to freeze
embryos, and even though practitioners in clinics that can cryopre-
serve embryos used this capability as a sign of superiority over the
clinics that did not. The enthusiasm for embryo cryopreservation
of some practitioners and reluctance to freeze embryos of others
hinges then on other factors than economic disparity with North
America and Europe.
10. Of course, the Catholic Church is onto the slipperiness of this
language. Last year the Vatican’s daily news report carried an article
entitled “Doublespeak: False Term Pre-Embryo Re-Emerges” (Zenit
2004).
11. See Rapp 1999 for a discussion of scientific literacy among lay
people in the United States.
12. All of the IVF patients I encountered in Ecuador had male part-
ners except one. These partners were called “husbands” whether the
couples were legally married or not.
13. Quichua is the most commonly spoken indigenous language
in Ecuador.
14. During the process of cryopreservation, plumes of liquid ni-
trogen smoke waft through the laboratory. I sometimes imagined
the smoke as emanating from a witch’s brew, which seemed appro-
priate given the tensions involved with putting these entities on ice.
15. This issue has been taken up in another way by some staff
and patients. I observed several nurses tell patients they were more
likely to get pregnant using frozen embryos. Patients sometimes told
me this as well. The nurses said that frozen embryos were obviously
stronger because they had survived the freezing and defrosting pro-
cess, and patients emphasized that they were often more relaxed on
their second cycle having been through it before and so they were
more likely to get pregnant.
16. Feo, or ugly, embryos are fragmented and/or asymmetrical
and, thus, were thought to have less chance of implantation.
17. Guayaquileño and Quiteño contestations for resources and
power, both economic and symbolic, became obvious in my study
of Ecuadorian IVF, in which claims about technological advance-
ments were constant topics of discussion. Although Guayaquil is the
preeminent commercial hub of Ecuador, Quito remains the more
prominent intellectual center, home to several more universities
than Guayaquil. The larger number of medical schools connected
to these universities most likely accounts for the fact that, despite
Guayaquil’s relative wealth, Quito has the greater number of IVF
clinics. One of Guayaquil’s IVF clinics produced the first IVF baby
in Ecuador in 1992, but Guayaquil is clearly “behind” Quito in the
business of IVF. The fact that only one of the two Guayaquileño clin-
ics had a (very new) cryopreservation program and five out of seven
in Quito have a program exemplified this difference to Quiteño IVF
practitioners.
18. Scholars who work in southern Europe, where the Catholic
Church remained more entrenched, document a similar set of con-
testations about the proper religious subject. In Iberia the post–
Vatican II church champions an “individual relationship” to God
that requires “interior subjectification” to access “profound real-
ties” as they dismiss the “collective,” “mechanical,” and “shallow”
forms of folk religious expression (Behar 1990; see also Badone 1990;
Brettell 1990; Wolf 1984).
19. Currently, 85–90 percent of Ecuadorians consider themselves
Catholic. The evangelization of Latin America has become one of
the most pressing issues in studies of Latin America religiosity to-
day (Cahn 2003; Dow and Sandstrom 2001; Muratorio 1981), given
that evangelical Protestantism has made large inroads all over Latin
America. However, in my sample only 10 percent of the patients,
and none of the practitioners, were identified as Protestant or Evan-
gelical.
20. There is a prevailing notion in Ecuador that Quiteños are more
cultured and better read than Guayaquileños.
21. Gamete and embryo donation are other practices expressly
condemned by the Catholic Church.
22. In Ireland, IVF practitioners have come up with another cre-
ative means to deal with the issue of extra embryos in the absence
of regulation in a Catholic nation. “In an effort to minimize the risk
of multiple pregnancies, [doctors] replaced surplus embryos in the
woman’s cervix, where they perished. This, as one critic has wryly
pointed out, was equivalent in effect to putting them in her ear”
(Egan 2005:17).
23. She also explained that she thought of the dish as a sort of
sentry system to warn of incubator contamination, figuring that if
bacteria invaded the incubator she would spot it in the dish with the
leftover embryos first.
24. Dr. Leon, another IVF biologist and clinic director, made a
similar comment when she explained that biologists and gynecol-
ogists are very different in respect to what they care about. “For
gynecologists it’s patients, for biologists it’s entities like embryos.”
Even though Dr. Leon thought she would have a hard time disposing
of frozen embryos, her connection to embryos was not about life.
“I respect the embryos because they are a part of me, or that is they
are a part of what I do.”
25. These worries that patients had about their responsibilities
toward frozen embryos are not concerns about the financial hard-
ships of raising more children, as we might imagine, even for pa-
tients with few economic resources. Neither embryos nor children
are thought of as potential burdens. Instead, anxiety arises because
of the mandate to care for children within one’s own family.
26. As a longtime observer of IVF in the United Kingdom and
the United States, Sarah Franklin writes, as well, that “the sense
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that a cryopreserved embryo suspended in a liquid nitrogen tank
is a biological relative is a commonplace experience for couples
undergoing in vitro fertilization” (Franklin 2001:313).
27. One difference between what I am describing for kin ethics
and Strathern’s Melanesian example is that in New Guinea, a be-
ing that is only constituted in its relations to others can accumulate
a much larger set of relations than a child in Quito, whose con-
stituting relations are sharply delimited by the bounds of a family
made up of parents, siblings, uncles, aunts, and cousins (Strathern
1992).
28. Thanks to Gay Becker for this term.
29. Waldby argues that the increased commercialization of tis-
sue transfers has resulted in the loss of “anonymous social trust” in
the United Kingdom (Waldby 2002). This analysis rings true given
that in Ecuador, where “anonymous social trust” has never been a
meaningful category, many IVF participants are worried about the
circulation of their bodily tissues.
30. This is especially noteworthy as antiglobalization protests
against ALCA, the Area de Libre Comerico de las Americas (in
English, the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, FTAA), shut
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